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Abstract 
Day by day the importance of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems is increasing for its powerful capabilities in 
automatic identification, localization and access control of the objects. However, the RFID techniques are plagued to security and
privacy issues due to underlying wireless communication channel. In order to come up with a solution, we propose an efficient 
authentication scheme which uses pseudorandom number generators (PRNG) and some simple cryptographic operations. 
Moreover, as the current generation tags come with in-built pseudo random generators, the implementations of these operations 
are possible with low complexity. The secret information stored inside the tags is communicated in a more secure way ensuring 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. The security of our proposed scheme is analyzed against different attacks on RFID
and with the performance of some existing protocols. Experimental results show a significant improvement in security with 
average cost, when compared with the existing techniques.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Technological advancements in the field of wireless communication have challenged most of the communications to 
operate without human intervention. RFID is a fast pervading wireless data collection technology having radio 
transmission that contains some identifying information about the objects for automatic identification. In RFID 
systems, the devices use electromagnetic fields wirelessly to exchange the identifying data. This technology is able 
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to overcome the problem of line-of-sight communication involved in bar code technology and now an emerging type 
of network that plays an important role in the Internet-of-Things (IoT)1. An RFID system comprises of tag, reader, 
and backend server as its main components. Tags, the basic building block of RFID, consist of a chip, antenna and a 
certain amount of computational and storage capabilities. A reader queries tag to obtain tag contents and sends the 
encrypted information received from the tag to the backend server for checking the legitimacy of the tag. The 
backend server contains a local database and some processors. The tags, the transponders, are queried by readers 
through a wireless insecure channel. The underlying channel between a reader and the backend server may be wired 
or wireless and is secured1 as shown in Fig. 1. The tags may be classified as passive, semi passive, and active, 
according to the way they are powered. In this paper, we have considered passive tags that require no internal power 
but are powered from the radio signal sent from the reader while they query the tag2.
                                                        Secure channel                    Insecure channel 
                                                       (Wired/wireless)                        (Wireless) 
Figure 1. Interaction between tag, reader, and backend server. 
As the passive tags have low storage and low computational capabilities, they suffer from many security flaws. Due 
to the limitations on storage, RFID authentication protocols use low cost cryptographic primitives like bitwise 
operations, pseudorandom number generators, hash functions etc3, 4... In the proposed scheme, pseudo random 
number generators are mainly used to provide secure authentication. The requirement of pseudo-randomness is 
based on the fact that the output of a random generator should be indistinguishable from uniformly distributed 
random variables. Randomness in seed value also plays an important role and it is very hard to find pseudorandom 
stream if the seed value is not known6. In our scheme, we use random numbers along with the secret value of tag as 
seed and update the secret of the tag after each authentication. The randomness property of the generators helps 
providing confidentiality and immunity to replay attack8. As the secret is updated after each session, forward secrecy 
is also ensured.  
      
     The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the reviews of related work have been discussed. 
Section 3, describes the proposed authentication scheme, using pseudo-randomness property. Section 4 presents 
security and privacy analysis. In section 5, the efficiency of the proposed scheme has been calculated and compared 
against some existing schemes. Finally, we conclude our paper in section 6. 
2. Related Work 
Several authentication schemes have been proposed for providing security in RFID systems. Here, we give a brief 
review of some protocols. Albert et al.2 use three phases for authentication: initialization, identification 
(synchronised and desynchronised), and updating phase. This protocol uses the PRNGs to produce an unpredictable 
pseudo-random sequence. In Fu et al.5, a scalable pseudo random based mutual authentication scheme is proposed 
that involves encryption based on symmetric key cryptography, random number generators, and hash function. It 
uses an alias of tag ID, updates it in every authentication, and requires EEPROM memory for this purpose. Min et 
al.7 discuss a dynamic token based authentication scheme. This protocol provides anonymity and authentication 
through random initialization of tokens and these tokens are updated dynamically through the use of the base token 
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and base indicator array used. This scheme however requires more storage in the tag for these arrays and updates. It 
does not support mutual authentication and prone to desynchronization attack. In the scheme of Gui et al.9, a hash 
function based keyed encryption is used for authentication and ownership transfer. This encryption function divides 
the tags into several groups and sequence of the tag requires to be checked. Irfan et al.10 proposed an authentication 
scheme based on cryptographic hash chain. But using the hash recursively more times requires more storage and 
computations.  The protocol proposed by Chang et al.11 is an improved version to the protocol by Venkatraman et 
al.14. They have detected some privacy concerns in the Venkatraman et al.’s protocol14 and proposed a new scheme 
without the RFID middleware. In the Chang et al.’s scheme11, an authentication process is carried out by considering 
the previous session termination. Rahman et al.12 discussed a protocol based on PRNG but it assumes that reader has 
all the secrets before authentication process starts and limits its applications. Li et al.13 provide an authentication 
scheme that uses pseudo-random generators at reader side and performs ID and key updating on every successful 
authentication. However, this scheme is not secure against the traceability attack. 
3. Proposed authentication scheme 
   Here we propose our scheme for securing an RFID system. It uses light cryptographic operations like PRNGs, 
hash functions, and XORs. We mention the assumptions and notations used in our scheme, followed by the 
authentication process. 
3.1 Assumptions 
We assume the RFID system with three entities: Tag, RFID reader, and backend server.  
x The communication channel between reader and backend server is fully secure. So we do not consider any 
security between them. 
x The tag is a passive device and communicates with reader through an insecure channel.  
x The tag contains two data fields (S, ID) i.e., secret of tag and tag pseudonym (index value in database). S is 
of 128 bits and ID is 96 bits in length. 
x As S is updated in tag, we require rewritable memory (EEPROM or FRAM) of 128 bits. 
x The backend server contains a local database that contains fields: ID, h(ID), SOld, SNew. Initially, the SOld
contains zero and SNew contains the secret value of tag. 
x Random numbers generated are of 96 bits in length. 
x Tag memory is insecure and vulnerable to physical attacks. 
     Table 1. List of notations used 
Symbol Meaning 
S, ID Secret and ID pseudonym of Tag 
SNew, SOld Current and previous session secrets of tag stored in backend server 
h()  One-way hash function 
PRNG(A) PRNG to find a random number with A as seed value 
PRNG(A,B) PRNG to find Bth Pseudo-random number with A as seed value  
|| Function of string concatenation 
๨ XOR operation 
3.2 Authentication process 
 The reader initiates the authentication process by querying the tag. The reader first selects a tag and then requests 
its information. The whole process is described below and depicted in Fig. 2. 
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                                                  Figure 2. Overview of our proposed scheme 
(1) Reader generates a random number (NR) and sends it to RFID tag. 
(2) After Receiving NR from reader, the tag generates another random number (NT). The tag then             
calculates V= PRNG (S๨NR๨NT) and H = h (ID), using the information (Tag ID, S) stored in tag. The tag 
sends V, H, and NT to reader. The reader forwards V, H, and NT received from tag to server along with NR
generated by it. 
(3) The server after receiving these values, retrieves database records of h(ID) to find if there is a record 
corresponding to H. 
• If no record is there corresponding to that value, then communication is terminated. 
• If a record is found, the server extracts the corresponding tag’s secret SNew from database and calculates 
V’= PRNG (SNew๨NR๨NT) to verify if V’ and the received V are identical or not. If they are equal, it is 
confirmed that the previous session was successful and tag contains SNew as its S value. The server 
sends SNew to reader. 
• If V’ and V are not equal, server extracts SOld value for the corresponding matched tag and calculates             
V’’= PRNG (SOld๨NR๨NT). It checks if V’’ and V are eqaul. If equality holds, then it makes the variable 
‘Flag’=1 and sends SOld to reader. Here, the server is confirmed about the unsuccessful previous session 
and the tag contains SOld  as its S value. 
(4) The reader takes the value (either SNew or SOld) as the seed from server and calculates M = NR
th pseudo-
random number. Using M as seed value, it calculates a random number (N) from PRNG. Reader sends N to 
tag and M to backend server. Here, ‘modulo’ operator can be used on NR to make it less complex for 
calculating NR
th pseudorandom number (M). The same must be done at tag side. 
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(5) To confirm the reader is authenticated, the tag calculates M’ = NR
th pseudorandom number by taking S (secret 
stored in tag) as initial seed value. Using M’ as seed value, it calculates a random number (N’) from PRNG. 
The tag verifies if N’ and N same. If they are same, the tag is confirmed that the information is from the 
legitimate reader. The tag calculates U = h(S||M’) and updates its secret value as S๨U.      
(6) The server after getting M value from reader checks the ‘Flag’ variable.  
ವ If Flag = 0, the secret of tag has matched with SNew value and calculates U = h(SNew||M). Then server 
updates the secret value in database as SOld= SNew, SNew= SNew๨U.  ವ If Flag = 1, the secret of tag has matched with SOld value and calculates U = h (SOld||M). Then server 
updates the secret value in database as SNew= SOld๨U and SOld remains unchanged.  
4. Security analysis 
   In this section, we give brief security analysis of our scheme against different common possible attacks in an RFID 
system.   
a) Tag Anonymity: Tag secrets are ‘S’ and ‘ID’. Our scheme never discloses publicly this information. Getting ‘S’ 
from PRNG (S๨NR๨NT) and ID from h(ID) is not possible. From ‘N’, an attacker cannot find the secret because N 
= PRNG (M) and M = PRNG (S, NR). M is never communicated directly between tag and reader. So, the tag 
anonymity is satisfied. 
b) Replay attack resistance: Getting the messages of a session will not help the attacker to do further operations in 
next session. On its first communication, the tag calculates V= PRNG (S๨NR๨NT). NR is a random number received 
from reader and NT is generated by the tag. If the attacker somehow knows NR, NT, and V, the value of ‘S’ is still 
unknown. Since the values of NR and NT change in every session, the replay attack is not possible.
c) De-synchronization resistance: In this attack, the attacker blocks, modifies some messages leading the entities to 
asynchronous updates. If any of the value {V, H, NT} communicated from the tag is blocked or changed, then the 
authentication process will be terminated. If ‘N’ is blocked or modified, the tag will not update ‘S’ value. However, 
in backend server, the secret is updated as SOld= SNew, SNew= SNew๨U, if flag =0, and SNew= SOld๨U, if flag = 1. So 
the tag secret will match SOld value for the next session and no asynchronous values. 
d) Confidentiality and integrity: The secret ‘S’ and index pseudonym ‘ID’ are confidential throughout the 
authentication process. If any message (i.e., V, H, NT) from the tag is changed, then it will lead to termination on 
verifying the equality of h(ID) column of the database with H and  V’= PRNG (SNew๨NR๨NT) or V’’= PRNG (SNew
๨NR๨NT) with V. Similarly, if N from reader is changed, then the tag can detect by verifying N’ with N, where N’ = 
PRNG(M’), M’ = PRNG (S, NR). Thus, both confidentiality and integrity are ensured.
e) Mutual Authentication: In mutual authentication, one entity authenticates other entity and vice versa. Upon 
receiving V, H, NT, NR from reader, the server checks the existence of H in database and equality of V’ or V
’’ with 
V. The reader authenticates the tag when it receives the secret value SOld or SNew as ‘S’ of the tag from the server.  
The tag authenticates the reader when the received value of N is equal to the calculated value PRNG (M’), where M’
= PRNG (S, NR).
f) Traceability resistance: In our scheme, the message communicated between the reader and tag (i.e., V, N) change 
at each session because V= PRNG (S๨NR๨NT) and N= PRNG (PRNG (seed, NR)), where NR and NT are random 
numbers generated for every session. The secret value is also updated on every successful completion of a session.  
Hence, it is very difficult for an adversary to track a tag based on the eavesdropped messages.
g) Forward secrecy: If an attacker gets access to the secret information about the tag in present session i.e. Si, the 
attacker will not be able to get the secret of previous session Si-1. Having value of Si, ID, and communicated 
messages in session i-1 will not reveal Si-1 because Si = Si-1๨U, where U = h (Si-1||M’) and M’ is itself calculated 
using the Si-1 value. The attacker can only get information whether the previous session was successful or not, but 
getting Si-1 from Si is not possible. Thus, it satisfies forward security. 
h) Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack resistance: The attacker can never be able to get meaningful information 
(S, ID) from the communicated messages NR, V, H, NT, and N because H is calculated as h(ID) using a one-way 
hash function. The values V, N are computed using PRNG operation with secret ‘S’ as seed. If the attacker changes 
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any message, it will lead to integrity problem and while checking the equality between the received value and the 
calculated value, due to inequality, the authentication process will be stopped.
i) DoS Attack resistance: In this type of attack, the attacker blocks some messages that lead to asynchronous 
updates in database value and tag secret value. If it happens, then next session onwards the legitimate tag will not be 
authenticated due to the value mismatch. In our scheme, the database of backend server contains SNew and SOld to 
resist this attack. If the message is blocked by the attacker while the reader sends ‘N’ to the tag, then the S value 
cannot be updated. But next time the tag can communicate with its value as the SOld value already exists in database. 
In success termination, the SNew value of database will be used as the tag secret otherwise SOld will be used. In this 
way, our protocol can stand against the DoS attack. 
In Table 2, we analyse security aspects of our scheme along with some recent authentication schemes against the 
most commonly occurring attacks in RFID systems. 
      Table 2.  Security comparison
                                   
                   
Fu et al.5 Gui et al.9 Chang et al.11 Li et al.13 Min et al. 7 Ours
Tag Anonymity Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Replay attack resistance Y Y Y Y Y Y 
De synchronization  resistance N N N Y N Y 
Confidentiality and integrity Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Mutual Authentication N Y Y Y N Y 
Traceability resistance N Y Y N Y Y 
Forward secrecy N Y Y N Y Y 
MITM Attack resistance Y Y Y Y Y Y 
DoS Attack resistance N N N Y N Y 
Y: Satisfies the property, N: Does not satisfy the property. 
5.  Performance analysis 
Here, we discuss performance analysis of our proposed scheme in terms of operations involved, storage, and 
communication overhead. The cost of operations of different protocols/schemes along with our scheme is shown in 
Table 3. The number of communications made with the tag is also mentioned in this table. 
      Table 3. Cost analysis
        No. of communications with tag  Computation cost at tag 
Fu et al. 5 4 5TC + 2TX + 4TH +2TR
Gui et al.9 4 3TC + 2TX + 3TH +2TR+1TF
Chang et al.11 3 5TC + 11TX + 4TH +2TR
Li et al.13 3 2TC + 2TX + 4TH +1TR
Min et al.7 3  (a*m +b* n) TX + 2TH +1TS+ 1TF
Ours 3     1TC + 1TX + 2TH + 1TR +3TP
Here we have denoted the symbols as follows: 
TC: Concatenation cost,   TX: XOR cost,  
TH: Hash function cost,   TR: Random number generation cost,  
TF: Flip operation cost,   TS: Circular shift cost,  
 TP: PRNG operation cost. 
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For Min et al.’s protocol7, m and n are lengths of two base arrays that store a-bit base tokens and b-bit base 
indicators. Doing so requires more storage spaces in tag. 
   In tag, we store only two types of information i.e., secret of tag (S) and ID pseudonym. According to EPC global 
GEN2 standard of RFID, we have chosen moderate value of 128 bits as tag’s secret and 96 bits of ID. Thus, total 
224 bits of storage requirement out of which 128 bits are programmable as the secret is updated after every session. 
As the recent standard passive tags contain memory in Kilobits15 (Tego UHF passive tag can store 2Kb, so 11% 
memory used for our scheme), we only use a small part of it and the remaining can be used for computations. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a secure authentication scheme that can be implemented in low cost passive tags. 
The recent passive tags (like EPC-C1-GEN2 standard) come with on-chip pseudorandom generator (PRNG). So, the 
operations involved in our scheme can be implemented with low cost. As the PRNG takes secret of 128 bit as seed 
value along with random numbers each time; it also satisfies the randomness property for the RFID tag. Our scheme 
is secure against the common attacks possible in an RFID system and can be extended to different areas like product 
authentication system, vehicle tracking, wireless sensor networks, mobile phone based tracking systems, supply 
chain system, etc. 
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